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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONNA McBROOM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HOWARD KIRTLEY McBRO,OM, 
Defendant 1and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9702 
Plaintiff's Brief with Respect to the Appeal 
By Plaintiff from th·e Decision of the 
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This matter came on for hearing on motion 
by the defendant for an order to show cause, order-
ing the plaintiff to show cause why the court should 
not fix visitation rights, restrain the plaintiff from 
punishing the children, restrain the plaintiff from 
removing the children from the State of Utah without 
the express permission of the court; an·d on the plain-
tiff's answer thereto and counter-petition, wherein 
the plaintiff petitioned the court for a judgment 
for delinquent support money under the decree of 
divorce in the sum of $200.00, to hold defendant in 
contempt of court for wilfully failing and refusing 
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to pay said money, and to restrain the defendant 
from coming upon the home premises of the plain-
tiff at 583 Cortez Street, for attorneys fees and costs 
of court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on the 9th and 11th days of 
July, 1962 before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow. 
From the decree of Judge Snow, the plaintiff appeals 
from the 'visitation provisions set forth in said order, 
the failure of the._court ~o grant judgment for the 
sum of $200.00 delinquent support money, the failure 
of the court to restrain defendant from interfering 
\vith the plaintiff's job or harassing the plaintiff at 
home or at work on the telephon·e or in any other 
manner, and from threatening the plaintiff with 
bodily harm; from the order restraining plaintiff 
from _ taking the minor children from the State of 
Utah without first securing th·e consent and per-
mission of the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks -(1) a judgment for $200.00 
delinquent support money to and including the 23rd 
day of June, 1962; (2) for visitation in accordance 
with the plaintiff's petition; (3) a restraining order 
restraining the defendant from interfering with the 
plaintiff's job, or harassing the plaintiff at home or 
at work on the telephone or in any other manner, 
and to restrain the defendant from threatening the 
plaintiff with bodily harm; (4) to vacate the re-
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straining order restraining plaintiff from removing 
the children from the State of Utah without the 
express permission of the court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to the decree of divorce entered by 
the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, judge of the above 
entitled court, the defendant was ordered to pay 
to plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month per child 
for the support and maintenance of the minor chil-
dren. Said payments were to commence as of the 
23rd day of March, 1962, and to be paid through the 
clerk of the court of Salt Lake County. R. 42, 43, 
and 44. Pursuant to Exhibit D (a) (1), th·e defend-
ant produced receipts showing $200.00 paid on May 
2, 196'2, $200.00 paid on M·ay 31, 1962, and $200.00 
paid on June 29, 1962. Accordingly, defendant is 
delinquent $200.00 in his support money, for which 
plaintiff should be awarded judgment. The other 
receipts which are part of defendant's Exhibit D 
(a) (1) show payment of $200.00 on February 2, 1962, 
a payment of $100.00 on March 1, 1962, a payn1ent 
of $75.00 on March 1, 1962, and payment of a water 
bill of $25.00 on March 1, 1962; all of said receipts 
being prior to the entry of the decree and the com-
mencement of the $200.00 pursuant to said decree 
of divorce. 
With respect to the visitation of the minor 
children, both plaintiff and defendant sought an 
order whereby specific times would be set up for 
the visitation of the minor children by the defend-
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ant. The plaintiff proposed that defendant be given 
the right to take the children and have th·em over 
night with hin1 every other weekend from Friday, 
at 6:00 o'clock p.m., until the following Saturday at 
6:00 o'clock, and for the alternate weekends to have 
them on Sundays from 1:00 o'clock p .. m. until 7:30 
p.m. in the evening. R. 627. In view of the fact 
th·at plaintiff \V1as working five days a week, plaintiff 
requested the right to hav·e them each Sunday morn-
in~g in order (to take them to Sunday School. R. 627. 
The defendant complained that plaintiff was 
not allowing him to see the children; wh·ereupon 
plaintiff testified that the defendant had visited and 
taken the children on the following occasions: 18th 
of March 12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; March 26th 
from 3:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.; Sunday, April 1st 
from 12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; April 6th until 
5:30 p.m.; Saturday, April 7th the defendant picked 
Kirt, the boy, up off the street at 3:00 p .. m. and did 
not return him until 6:00 p.m.; the following Sunday 
from 12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; the lOth of April 
from 12:00 o'clock until1:00 o'clock; April 12th from 
3:30 p.m. until 5:30 p.m.; Friday, the 13th of April, 
from 3:30 until 5:30 p.m.; April 14th, April 15th, 
from 12:00 noon until 8:00 p.m.; on Friday, April 
20th, he picked them up at 3:20 p.m. and returned 
them the following Sunday night at 8:30 p .. m., this 
was the Easter Weekend; April 23rd one hour with 
them at the tenders; April 24th an hour after school 
at the tenders and also th·e 25th of April; on Sunday 
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Aptil 29th from 12:00 noon until 7:30 p.n1.; on May 
4th defendant picked the little girl up and took her 
to the beauty parlor and had her until that evening; 
May 6th, a Sunday, they had the measles and could 
not go with defendant; the following week he called 
them every day at the tenders to see how they were, 
and saw them every day. Friday, the 11th of May, 
he picked them up after school and kept them over 
night, returning them the following Saturday morn-
ing. May 13th, Mother's Day, he had them from 
12:00 noon until 8:30 p.m.; May 18th he was at the 
tenders with the children from 3:00 until 4:30p.m.; 
May 20th from 12:00 noon until 7:30 p.m.; on the 
24th of May from 3:30 until 5:30 p.m.; on the 25th 
of May he picked them up after school and kept 
them over night until the following Saturday at 
noon; the following Sunday he had them from 12:00 
noon until 3:30 p.m. Th·e following Monday he had 
them from 3:30 until 5:00 p.m. The 29th of May, 
the last day of school, he picked them up from school 
and kept them that night and all the following day, 
\rhich was Memorial Day, without any permission 
or advance notice. On June 1st from 3:00 until 4:00 
at the tenders; June 4th, 5th and 6th he visited them 
at the tenders from 20 to 45 minutes each day; on 
June 8th from .2:00 until 4:00 o'clock; June 17th 
from 12:00 noon until 9:00 p.m; Sunday, June 24th 
from noon until 9:00 o'clock. 
The above testimony of plaintiff is set forth at 
pages R. 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633. 
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Plaintiff testified that she was afraid of the 
defendant; that he might inflict some harm upon 
her; and testified: R. 634 
"Q. And can you tell us what that fear 
is based on? 
"A. Well, two occasions during our mar-
riage-
"MR. HYDE: Just a minute. I object 
to anything prior to the decree. 
"THE WITNESS: All right. Then since, 
there have been several conversations on the 
telephone where threats have been made. On 
one occasion he said he didn't care what hap-
pened or how this turned out in the Supreme 
Court, if I was awarded the children he would 
see to it that I wouldn't live to raise them. 
"Q. Now, you've heard the defendant's 
testimony in which he stated that he told you 
that he would use force if necessary to pre-
vent you from taking the children out of the 
state? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. This conversation or threat that he 
made to you, did it cause you to have fear 
of him? 
"A. Yes, it does. 
"Q. Safety for yourself and your chil-
dren? 
"A. Yes." 
The court at page 663 of the record stated: 
"THE COURT: Well, of course, both 
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parties, when we are through with this hear-
ing, both parties are going to be restrained 
from any unwarranted interference with the 
other. And this Court is going to delineate 
the sphere of activities of each party so there 
is no question about these children being 
picked up on Saturday and odd hours without 
the consent and acquiescence of the other 
other party * * * ." R. 663 
Further, plaintiff testified that she had been 
harassed both at her job, at hon1e, and by the tele-
phone. And the plaintiff upon being requested by 
the court to disclose her present employm·ent and 
her telephone number, refused to do so. Where-
upon the court at page R. 663 of the record, stated 
to the plaintiff: 
"THE COURT: There will be no worries 
fron1 Mr. Mc_Broom, because he'll be in con-
tempt of this Court if he in any way interferes 
with you in connection with your job. So you 
may tell the court where you work and what 
hours." 
The plaintiff had already lost her job at the Ken-
necott Copper Corp. and was fearful that further 
harassment would cause her to lose her present 
employment. R. 662. The court specifically indicated 
it would restrain the defendant from in any way 
interfering with the plaintiff's job, but failed to 
include this as a part of the court's order. R. 664, 665. 
The testimony of defendant with respect to the 
court's order restraining plaintiff from removing 
the children from the state of Utah without the 
consent of the court is as follows: R: 616 line 21. 
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"Q. Have you ever threatened Mrs. Me 
Broom since this trial? 
"A. (Mr. McBroom) When she told me 
-yes, I threatened her to this extent that I 
told her I would use force if necessary to pre-
vent her taking the children out of th·e state 
and me ever seeing them again. And I also 
told her-
"Q. Well, now, what was the occasion for 
this? 
"A. A telephon·e call. It was this conver-
sation around the end of May regarding the 
appeal and this lawsuit. And I told her that 
I'd use force to see that this didn.'t occur. 
And I also promised her that I wouldn't 
let her raise these children. Eventually I 
wouldn't. I can't permit that. And what I 
meant was that I had faith in the law. But 
sh·e called me on it and she said, "You mean 
law or no law, you're not going to let me 
raise the children?" And I said, "I am going 
to take those children period." And I can't 
permit this. I can't do it." R. 617. Also see R. 
615, 616, 620. 
There was never any testimony by plaintiff to 
the effect that she intended taking the children 
from the state, except as a matter of self-preserva-
tion against the threats that the defendant was 
making to do her physical harm. Plaintiff testified 
at R. 637: 
"Q. (By Mr. McCullough to Mrs. Me 
Broom) Now, your husband testified that 
there was a three-week period around May 
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28th when you refused to allow the children, 
allow him to visit the children because some-
thing about he did not agree to drop this 
adultery suit. Do you recall any conversation 
with him of that nature? 
"A. (R. 638) I recall telling him that I 
couldn't stand the constant phone calls, the 
harassment, the threats of valentines, which 
he refers to as being subpoen!as or court orders, 
and that unless he left me alone I was going 
to have to leave just for my own peace of 
mind. I couldn't take it. 
"Q. These telephone calls you refer to, 
are they frequent? 
"A. Every night. There wasn't a night 
without them. 
"Q. And have they caused you to become 
upset? 
"A. Yes. I have had the number changed 
to an unlisted number just in the last few 
days. 
"Q. And that's because you couldn't 
stand-
" A. Because I can't take it. 
"Q. Did you ever tell the defendant that 
you would not live up to the order of the 
court? 
"A. Never, never did." 
Plaintiff testified that she had never degraded 
the defendant in the eyes of the children (R. 627) 
nor had she ever punished them because of their 
having gone with their father for reasonable visita-
tion. R. 628. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR $200.00 DELINQUENT SUPPORT 
MONEY TO AND INCLUDING THE 23RD DAY OF JUNE, 1962. 
The decree of divorce specified that the defend-
ant was to pay $200.00 per month for the support 
and maintenance of the .minor children, said pay-
ments to commence as of the 23rd day of March, 
196.2. As of the 23rd day of June, 1962, the defendant 
had made payments of only $600.00. According to 
the decree four monthly payments had accrued for 
a total of $800.00, leaving a deficiency of $200.00. 
The defendant attempted to show by receipts, that 
he had paid prior to the entry of the decree that 
he was not delinquent in said support. However, 
defendant's exhibit D (a) (1) shows a payment of 
$200.00 on February 2, 1962, a payment of $200.00 
on March 1, 1962, a payment of $75.00 on March 1, 
1962, and a payment of a water bill for $25.00 on 
March 1, 1962. All of said payments were prior to 
the entry of the d·ecree of divorce on the 23rd day 
of March, 1962, and cannot affect the order of the 
court dated the 23rd day of March, 1962. Accord-
ingly the lower court should be instructed to enter 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defend-
ant for the sum of $200.00 delinquent support money 
to and including the 23rd day of June, 1962. In 
additio11 thereto, interest should be adde·d to said 
judgment at the rate of sro per annum from the 
due date, to-wit June 23, 1962, to date of judgment, 
10 
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and thereafter· at the rate of 8)'; per annum. See 
LARSON v. LARSON, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P.2d 421. 
This court has ruled that the defendant has the 
burden in a contempt proceeding to show the amount 
of support money paid. See OPENSHAW v. OPEN-
SHAW, 86 Utah 229, 42 P.2d 191. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET UP 
VISITATION RIGHTS FOR THE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER AND COUNTER PETITION. 
The plaintiff specified in her answer and counter 
petition the reasonable visitation which she felt the 
court should award to the defendant, to-wit: that 
the defendant should be able to pick up the children 
and have them over night with him every other 
weekend from Friday at 6:00 o'clock p.m. until Sat-
urday at 6:00 o'clock p.m. That on alternate week-
ends the defen~dant should 'be able to pick up and take 
the children with him on Sunday afternoons from 
1:00 o'clock until 7:30 in the evening. The plaintiff's 
testimony in detail is set forth in the statement of 
facts showing the times and places when the defend-
ant had taken the children prior to the hearing 
before Judge Snow, and based thereon, certainly 
the defendant could hav·e no reasonable grounds 
upon which to complain that he was being denied 
visitation. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in order 
to know when the children were taken and at what 
time, proposed a reasonable ·visitation period for 
the defendant. Further, in view of the fact that 
the plaintiff was working five days a week, she felt 
11 
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it was only proper that she should have a portion 
of each weekend in which she could devote time to 
the children. Specifically the plaintiff requested the 
right to have the children on Sunday morning in 
order to take them to Sunday School. The lower 
court, however, in setting up the visitation periods 
entirely ignored the suggestions of visitation on 
the ~part of the plaintiff, and specified that de-
fendant \should have and take the children from 
3:00 o'clock p.m. on Friday to 7:30 p.m. the following 
Sunday of every other weekend; that on the alter-
nate weekend the defendant should have the right 
to take them at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday morning 
and return them that night at 7:30 p.m. 
The lower court in substituting its judgment 
for that of the plaintiff mother, has entirely ignored 
the reasonable requests of the plaintiff. Certainly 
if the trial court in awarding custody of these chil-
dren to plaintiff felt she was competent to have 
custody awarded to her, and a fit and proper person 
for such, it should not then turn around and slap this 
1nother in the face by telling her that the visita-
tion periods which she has set out, and which are 
entirely reasonable, are not proper. The court should 
not arbitrarily set up periods of ti1ne which do 
not conform to the mother's work schedule or give 
her proper time to devote to the children. The effect 
of the lower court's decree is to say to this mother 
that you can have the children ''"'ith you on Sunday 
every other wekend. The lower court did eliminate 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
son1e of the difficulty which the plaintiff mother was 
suffering because of the defendant's unrestrained 
visitation of the children. And the lower court did 
specify in paragraph 3 of its order, "The defendant 
is restrained from taking said children with defend-
ant except as herein provided without the consent of 
plaintiff first had and obtained." R. 83. 
The visitation which the plaintiff mother had 
set up for the children and to which she testified in 
detail certainly do not demonstrate that this plain-
tiff mother was attempting to limit or be unreason-
able with the defendant with respect to visitation 
\vith these minor children. In view of the stormy 
proceedings and the animosity that exists between 
these parties, it would seem unfair that the lower 
court would substitute its judgm-ent for that of the 
plaintiff mother with respect to the visitation 
periods, particularly where the 'visitation periods 
specified by the plaintiff mother are entirely reason-
able and have been made in good faith on the part 
of the plaintiff and for the best interests of the 
minor children. Accordingly the plaintiff requests 
this court to modify the visitation periods in accord-
ance with the periods specified by the plaintiff in 
her answer and counter petition before the court. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RESTRAIN 
THE DEFENDANT FROM INTERFERING WITH THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S JOB, OR HARASSING THE PLAINTIFF AT HOME_ OR 
AT WORK, ON THE TELEPHONE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER, 
AND IN REFUSING TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANT FROM 
THREATENING PLAINTIFF WITH BODILY HARM. 
The testimony of the plaintiff and corroborated 
13 
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by the testimony of the defendant, all as specifically 
set forth in the statement of facts, shows a definite 
threat on the part of the defendant to inflict bodily 
harm to the plaintiff, and to harass her on her job 
and at home. The defendant made no secret of the 
fact that he intended to continue such activity until 
he had gained his objective of taking these children 
from their mother. Based upon said expressed in-
tention of the defendant, and particularly in view 
of the fact that the lower court stated during the 
court proceeding that it would protect the plaintiff 
by a restraining order, the lower court should in 
its final decree hav·e entered a restraining order 
restraining the defendant from interfering with 
plaintiff's job, or harassing the plaintiff at home or 
at work, and restraining the defendant from threat-
ening the plaintiff with bodily harm. The request 
of plaintiff in this regard was reasonable, and 
should have been granted in view of the testimony 
of both plaintiff and defendant. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DOWER COURT TO ·RESTRAIN 
THE PLAINTIFF FROM TAKING THE l\IINOR CHILDREN OUT 
OF THE STATE OF UTA·H, OR I·N ANY MANNER CAUSING 
SAID CHIL'DREN TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
The only purpose of the plaintiff in telling the 
d·efendant that she would take the children and 
leave, was to cause the defendant to cease his har-
assment, phone calls, and threats of "valentines." 
In view of th·e expressed intention of the defendant 
14 
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that he was going to take the children from their 
mother regardless of the circumstances ·and the 
orders of the court, certainly the plaintiff's threat 
to leave the state was the only protection she felt 
she had recotlrse to. It is not necessary to repeat 
the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant in this 
regard. It is set forth in full in the statement of 
fact. The order of the lower court does not do 
justice to the situation and particularly in view of 
the fact that the court has provided no safeguards 
for the plaintiff's protection. If the lower court 
felt there was sufficient justification for entering 
an order of the type which it did, then in all fair-
ness the lower court should have provided adequate 
safeguards to the plaintiff in order that her removal 
from the confines of the state would not be nec-
essary to protect her from the threats of physical 
harm by the defendant. 
The plaintiff does not quarrel with the proposi-
tion as cited by this court and universally accepted 
to the effect that the court should maintain control 
of the minor children of the parties and maintain 
said children within the jurisdiction of the court. 
But having accepted such propostion, the court 
should also provide adequate safeguards for the 
plaintiff against the expressed threats of physical 
15 
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harm to her by the defendant. See GRIFFIN v. 
GRIFFIN, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84; ALLEY v. ALLEY, 
67 Utah 316, 247 P 301. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH 
304 East First South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appell,ant 
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